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EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH ANT)
SEIZURE
By MRTiN R. GLENN*
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Volstead Act for the enforce-
ment of the Eighteenth Amendment, the question as to the use
of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure has obtained a
greatly increased importance, and has given rise to many con-
troversies in the courts. Evidence is often obtained by methods
that are reprehensible in good morals and offensive to fair deal-
ing. And evidence is sometimes obtained under circumstances
which meet with the unqualified disapprobation of the courts.
The real question upon which the courts and writers are de-
bating is whether evidence, obtained by violations of constitu-
tional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seizures, is
admissable. There are two lines authorities, one holding that
such evidence is admissable, while the other line of authority
holds that such evidence is not admissable. Although a majority
of the states have adopted the former view, the Supreme Court
of the United States, the Federal Courts, and a few of the state
courts adhere to the latter doctrine.
HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 1
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated." Similiar provisions are found
in all of the state constitutions, except in New York, where such
*Bachelor of Arts degree, University of Kentucky, 1930; Instructor
of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1930-31, 1931-32; Bache-
lor of Law degree, University of Kentucky, January 1932; Member
Kentucky Bar. Practicing attorney in Madisonville, Kentucky.
'For readings on the history of the Fourth Amendment see: How-
ard, Preliminaries of the Revolution (1905) (Am. Nation Vol. 8); 2
Bancroft, History of the United States (1890); Black on Constitutional
Law, 3rd edition (1910); 2 Hildreth, History of the United States. 31
Yale Law Journal 518.
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provision is not in the constitution but has been written into the
Civil Rights Law. 2
The historical reasons for the Fourth Amendment are well
known. Osmond K. Frankel has well related this historical
narrative in substance which is as follows :3
The demand for this amendment can be traced to two nearly
contemporaneous incidents in the history of England and the
American colonies. From ancient times it had been customary
for justices to issue search warrants for the seizure of stolen
property. The circumstances under which such warrants
might be issued were discussed by Lord Coke4 and Sir Matthew
Hale.5  They were looked upon with disfavor. As was said by
Lord Camden, they "crept into the law by imperceptible prac-
tice."
By the time of Charles II, search warrants were issued in
Star Chamber proceedings to find evidence among the papers of
political suspects. So there grew up the easy method of issuing
general warrants which permitted the widest discretion to petty
officials. Wilkes, the great champion of individual rights and
liberties, was instrumental in destroying the practice. The
objectionable warrants were declared illegal by Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington,6 by Lord Mansfield in Money v. Leach, 7
by Lord Pratt in Hucile v. Mfoney,8 and finally by the House of
Commons.9
At about the same time similar proceedings were taking
place on this continent. Smuggling was a general offense, both
in England and in the Colonies. Before the close of the French
and Indian War, in order to obtain money for meeting its co3t
and to suppress an extensive illegal traffic with, the enemy
islands, the attempt was made to discover smugglers and to con-
fiscate their goods by the use of writs of assistance.' 0 These
much resembled the general warrants used in England. James
2 Section 8, originally adopted in 1928, Rev. Stat. pt. 1, ch. 4. 25
Columbia Law Rev. at pages 11 and 12.
a "Concerning Searches and Seizures" by Osmond K. Fraenkel, 34
Harvard Law Rev. 361 (1921).
Institutes, Book 4, pages 176-177.
2 Pleas of the Crown 149.
019 How St. Tr. 1029.
3 Burr. 1742.
82 Wilson, 205.
9 Commons Journal, April 22-25, 1776.
10 3 Channing's History of the U. S. 2-4.
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Otis, then Attorney-General of the colony of Massachusetts, re-
signed his office to attack these warrants. In a speech of great
eloquence he questioned the right of Parliament to authorize such
writs. 11  Regarding this speech Jobn Adams subsequently
said:12 "Then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and
there the Child Independence was born."
Therefore it was but a natural incident that the people
should demand a constitutional provision expressly denying to
the new government the right to authorize unreasonable searches
and seizures. 13 The securing of such a guaranty, both in Eng-
land and in this country, was considered by the people as the
emancipation of the right of privacy from the prying eyes of
the government. Chatham, in his speceh on general warrants,
said: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all
the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake;
the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; but the
King of England may not enter."
TnE CoMMoN LAkw RULE
The common-law rule regarding the admissability of evi-
dence is that the courts will not inquire into how the evidence
was obtained when one it has been presented. The illegal method
of obtaining the same does not taint its veracity. 14
In the following twenty-three states the courts have held
that the illegal or irregular means of procuring evidence is not
vause for its rejection at the trial: Alabama, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticutt, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New-
Mexico, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and
Virginia. Ohio, Delaware, Rhode Island and Maine make some
restrictions on evidence so obtained, while in Arizona the ques-
tion has been expressly reserved for future decision.' 5
".Amer. History Leaflets (Channing & Hart), No. 33, on James
Otis' speech on the Writs of Assistance, 1761.
12 Letter from John Adams to William Tudor, March 29, 1317, Old
South Leaflets. Vol. 8, No. 179, page 60.
"Vol. II Willoughby on the Constitution of the U. S.
21Shiehls v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894). People v. Camp-
bell, 160 Mich. 108, 125 N. W. 42 (1910).
' Cornelius on Searches and Seizures.
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The rule is based on the theory that a far-reaching miscar-
riage of justice would result if the public were to be denied the
right to use convincing evidence of a defendant's guilt be-
cause it had been brought to light through the excessive zeal of
an individual, whether an officer or not, whose misconduct must
have been deemed his own act and not that of the state.'(
TnE ExcLusION RuLn
Although a majority of the states have adopted the com-
mon-law view, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Boyd v. United States,17 adopted what has come to be
known as the "exclusion rule." In this case the plaintiffs in
error had, against their protest, been required to produce the
invoice of certain cases of goods, which invoice had been used
as evidence against the plaintiffs upon a charge of defrauding
the customs, of which charge they had been convicted. There
was thus raised the double issue as to whether the plaintiffs in
error had been unconstitutionally compelled to incriminate
themselves and, secondly, whether the compulsory production
of the invoice had amounted to an unreasonable search and seiz-
ure. In both respects it was held that the rights of the plain-
tiffs had been unconstitutionally violated, and the evidence was
rejected.
The converse of the Boyd case is the case of Weeks v. United
States,'5 in which the court held that documents and contra-
band lottery tickets illegally seized were inadmissable because
the taking was in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Weeks doctrine was affirmed
in Gouled v. United States'9 where writings were seized illegally
by federal officers, and in Amos v. United States20 where con-
traband liquor was found in a search of defendant's home with-
out a warrant. In the Gouled and Amos cases it was held that
the privilege against self-incrimination found in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution was also violated
by the admission of the evidence.
2 State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654 (1910).
21116 U. S. 616 (1886).
'18 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
29255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).
0 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921).
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The case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States21
gives additional strength to the Constitution. Representatives
of the Department of Justice, without a shadow of authority,
went to the office of a corporation and made a clean sweep of all
the books, papers and documents found there. Photographic
copies of material papers were made and an indictment was
framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The originals
were then returned to the corporation. Subpoenas to produce
these originals were then served and failure to obey these was
punished by the District Court as contempt. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment. Justice Holmes said that it would
reduce the Fourth Amendment to mere words if the protection
of the Constitution covered only the physical possession of the
documents but not the advantages that the Government gains
over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act. The
seizure was, he said, "an outrage," and he refused to allow the
Government to make any use of the knowledge gained through
its wrongdoing.
Nineteen state courts have followed the exclusion doctrine
as announced by the United States Supreme Court and as fol-
lowed by the Federal courts. These states that refuse, subject
to certain restrictions and limitations, to admit evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.2 2
It is submitted by the author of this article that the minority
rule is the better one. The exclusion rule is more subservient to
the principles of justice; it is an embodyment of the legislative
intents of the framers of our federal and state Constitutions; it
is a pragmatic necessity in proper law enforcement.
THE KENTUCKY Ruim
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
has been substantially written into the Kentucky Consitution
which declares, in Section 10, as follows:
"The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
-- 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
0 Cornelius on Searches and Seizures.
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possessions from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant
shall issue to search a place, or seize any person or thing, without de-
scribing as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation."
The Kentucky view has been well stated in the case of
Divine v. Commonwealth. 23 In that case the defendant was con-
victed of the crime of grand larceny, and a sentence of imprison-
ment for a term of three years was imposed upon him. He
thereupon prosecuted an appeal from the judgment, one of the
grounds being that certain evidence obtained by a search of his
home under an invalid search warrant was inadmissable against
him. The validity of the search warrant was assailed upon the
grounds that the affidavit therefor was in sufficient, and that the
warrant itself was not signed by the county judge in person, but
by his official stenographer. The Court of Appeals did not con-
sider the question of the insufficiency of the affidavit, but held
that the failure of the county judge to sign the search warrant
was fatal to its validity. Then the court stated that "the evi-
dence obtained by virtue of the search of appellant's house under
the invalid warrant was not admissible against him, and failure
to exclude it requires reversal of the judgment." The court re-
lied upon the cases of Mlabry v. Commonwealth, 24 Keith v. Com-
monwealth 25 and Reed v. Commonwealth. 20
In Bruner v. Commonwealth 27 Justice Quinn, speaking for
the Court of Appeals, said: "Both the federal and state Consti-
tutions guarantee to the people security of their persons, houses
and possessions from unreasonable search and seizure . ...
rights that will be protected, though to do so in certain instances
might retard or defeat the ends of justice. The courts have
ever protected the sanctity of the home, and will always guard
with zealous care one's indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense."
Analogous with the exclusion rule adopted by the United
States courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals holds that the
protection against illegal searches and seizures is directed at the
sovereignty acting through its officers, and has no application to
2236 Ky. 579, 33 S. W. (2d) 627 (1930).
"196 Ky. 626, 245 S. W. 129 (1922).
197 Ky. 364, 247 S. WV. 42 (1923).
233 Ky. 184, 25 S. "W. (2d) 77 (1930).
2192 Ky. 386, 233 S. W. 795 (1921).
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illegal searches made by private individuals as to whom the in-
jured party is limited to his remedy in trespass. 28 Likewise, the
state guaranties against unreasonable search do not apply to th.e
acts of federal officers and evidence obtained by such officers
by a search under a warrant not conforming to state law may be
admitted against the accused in a prosecution in the state court,
though such evidence will be excluded by the state court unless
the acts of the federal officers were under a warrant valid under
the federal law.29
The Kentucky court further agrees with the federal exclu-
sion rule in that the constitutional provisions against unreason-
able searches and seizures do not extend to woods, fields, or open
spaces remote from the dwelling,30 and evidence procured in a
search, even though made without a warrant at all, is competent
if the search was made with the consent of the person in posses-
sion of the premises. 31
However, the Kentucky rule has gone even beyond the
orthodox exclusion rule in one important respect. The United
States Supreme Court, the Federal Courts, and all of the state
courts that adhere to the exclusion theory, require a seasonable
application for the return of the evidence to be made within a
reasonable time after the accused learns of the illegal search and
seizure. But in Kentucky the accused may demand the return
of such evidence at the time of trial. In Youman v. Common-
wealth32 the Kentucky court said: "In our practice the proper
time, and the only time, in which objection can be made to the
introduction of evidence by the mouth of witnesses is when it
is offered during trial, and we cannot think of any good reason
this practice should not obtain in a case like the one we are now
considering."
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
However strong may be the language of the Fourth Amend-
- Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921);
Chapman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 439, 267 S. W. 181 (1924).
"Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250 S. AV. 839 (1923);
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 75, 266 S. W. 880 (1924).
"Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 240 S. W. 45 (1922).
"Marshall v. City of Newport, 200 Ky. 663, 255 S. AV. 259 (1923);
Richardson v. Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 434, 266 S. W. 1 (1924).
"189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
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ment to the United States Constitution, the fact remains that it
is not self-executing. The same is true of most of the similar
provisions found in state constitutions. Although they un-
equivocally prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures they
usually fail to state what disposition is to be made of the evi-
dence so secured. The language of these provisions is manda-
tory. To be at all sensible it is necessary that a construction be
given which will effectively curtail the acts that are prohibited.
Chief Justice Carroll, in the case of Youman v. Common-
wealth,3 3 was prompted to ask: "Will courts, established to ad-
minister justice and enforce the laws of tbhe state, receive, over
the objection of the accused, evidence offered by the prosecution
that was admittedly obtained by a public officer in deliberate dis-
regard of the law, for the purpose of securing the conviciton of
an alleged offender? In other words, will courts authorize and
encourage public officers to violate the law, and close their eyes
to methods that must inevitably bring the law into disrepute, in
order that the accused may be found guilty?"
Opponents of the exclusion doctrine reply that: (1) It has
long been established that the admissability of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which the party
has been enabled to obtain the evidence; (2) as an original
proposition, it is an unwise policy to refuse to permit the gov-
ernment to use such evidence in that there is no exigent require-
ment of such, a rule in the Constitution, and the enforcement of
law is unnecessarily hampered by its adoption. Proponents of
this argument would have the courts permit evidence to be used,
though obtained by ever so flagrant a violation of the Constitu-
tion, and would secure the protection of the citizen by the direct
punishment of the officer for his intrusion.34
This is reducing an academic theory to a practical absurdity.
Any observing layman can readily see that, as a matter of fact,
the officer is not punished and any talk of punishing him is but
a sham, a pretense and a travesty upon justice. The adoption
of such unsound, unreasonable and unjust practices would only
result in a growing sentiment of utter disregard for the law. It
is but a mockery of the Constitution for a court, whose duty it
is to protect the citizens, to retain the fruits of unconstitutional
"Cited supra.
8 American Bar Association Journal 646-647.
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searches and seizures and give the citizen nothing but a pretense
of redress by threatening against the wrongdoer a punishment
which is seldom or never inflicted.
Several methods of enforcing these constitutional provisions
against unreasonable searches and seizures have been suggested
by Mr. Thomas E. .Atkinson.3 and may be briefly stated as fol-
lows:
1. Self help, which means making physical resistance to
attempts to make unreasonable searches and seizures.
In many cases this remedy would fail because the search is often
made in the person's absence. However, if the person be present he
may exert sufficient force to prevent the unreasonable search and, pos-
sibly, may kill the officer if necessary. But this method is extremely
complicated and perilous. The person must decide for himself whether
or not the search is reasonable, and if he erroneously decides that it
Is unreasonable he lays himself open to serious consequences in re-
sisting.
2. Civil suit against the offending officer.
This remedy Is also unsatisfactory. The injury sustained by the
Innocent person Is usually not a substantial physical or property in-
jury, but is an Injury based on an unlawful invasion of the person's
right of privacy. Only a very few jurisdictions have as yet recognized
the existence of such a right, and even in those states where the right
has been recognized juries are somewhat reluctant to assess large dam-
ages where there is no tangible evidence of the injury.
3. Criminal action against the offending officer.
This is a ridiculous suggestion. Certainly a court that believes
that the end justifies the means 'will not take advantage of unconsti-
tutionally seized evidence for the purpose of convicting the defendant
and then face about and convict the officer who secured the evidence.
And, even assuming that the court would practice such hypocrisy, it
is reasonable to predict that the prosecuting attorney would be lenient
toward one who has overstepped the bounds of his authority in an
over-zealous effort to help the present administrators of justice estab-
lish a record for law and order.
If punishment of the officer should become effective such a practice
would render the enforcement of the law even more inefficient. En-
forcement officers, ever mindful of tbe probable serious consequences
of their acts, would become timorous and pusillanimous guardians of
the public welfare. In many cases they would refrain from executing
their official duties because of fear of future punishment.
One of the most illogical arguments ever presented by the
opponents of the exclusion theory was advanced in the case of
' 25 Columbia Law Review, pages 11-29.
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Hall v. Commonwealth.30 In this case the Virginia court says:
"A police officer, when acting without a warrant or under a void
warrant, acts without authority or color of authority from the
state, and ceases to be its agent and he alone is responsible for
his illegal acts."
A careful analysis of this decision shows that it absolutely
nullifies the constitutional provisions against unreasonable
searches and seizures which apply to governmental officers. If
the officer is armed with a warrant, or other lawful authority, the
provisions found in the constitution would not apply because the
search is not unreasonable. On the other hand, if the officer
makes a search without lawful authority then, according to the
Virginia court, he acts for himself and not as an agent of the
state. It would therefore be impossible to conceive of a case in
which the constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches
and seizures would apply.27
There is only one means of satisfactory enforcement of these
constitutional provisions and that is the adoption of the exclu-
sion theory. This theory will effectively enforce the legal maxim
that "every man's house is his castle," which is a part of our
Constitutional law and which has always been looked upon as
of high value to the citizen.38 Although other kinds of illegality
do not keep out evidence, in this particular instance the illegality
is condemned by the United States Constitution which is the
"supreme law of the land," or by the state constitutions whicli
are the supreme laws of their respective states.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing pages the author has attempted to briefly
sketch the historical background of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which amendment has been sub-
stantially written into practically all of the state constitutions.
The author has shown the different interpretations placed upon
these constitutional provisions by various jurisdictions, and has
stated his reasons for holding that the exclusion doctrine offers
16138 Va. 727, 121 S. E. 154 (1924).
1' State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100 (1924).
3S Cooley on Constitutional Limitations.
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the only practical method of enforcing these safeguards of per-
sonal liberty.
The need of these guaranties has not ceased to exist. With
the increase in population and the migration of people to cities
and towns there has developed a cosmic political and social struc-
ture in which "the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects" is as sacred and valuable today
as in the early colonial period. If this fundamental right is not
secured to the people by declaring that any evidence obtained
by unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissable, there is
no limit to the extent that evangelical and fanatical enforcement
officers may violate the sacred "right of castle" doctrine ex-
pressed in the, constitutional provisions against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
K. L. J.--6
